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We characterize the agreements that the players of a noncooperative game may 
reach when they can communicate prior to play, but they cannot reach binding 
agreements: A coalition-proo[ equilibrium is a correlated strategy from which no 
coalition has an improving and self-enforcing deviation. We show that any corre-
lated strategy whose support is contained in the set of actions that survive the 
iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies and weakly Pareto dominates 
every other correlated strategy whose support is contained in that set, is a 
coalition-proof equilibrium. Consequently, the unique equilibrium of a dominance 
solvable game is coalition-proof. Joumal o[ Economic Literature Classification 
Numbers: C72, D82. 
INTRODUCTION 
When the players of a noncooperative game have the opportunity to 
communicate prior to play, they will try to reach an agreement to coordi-
nate their actions in a mutually beneficial way. The aim of this paper is to 
characterize the set of agreements that the players may reach. Since we 
consider situations where agreements are nonbinding, only those agree-
ments that are not subject to viable (i.e., self-enforcing) deviations are of 
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2interest. As preplay communication aHows the players to correlate their 
play, we take the set of aH correlated strategies as the space of feasible 
agreements. We characterize the set of coalition-proof equilibria as the set 
of agreements from which no coalition has a self-enforcing deviation 
making aH its members better off. 
Admitting correlated strategies as feasible agreements alters the set of 
coalition-proof equilibria of a game in a fundamental way (viz., no inclu-
sion relationship between the notion of coalition-proofness that we pro-
pose and others previously introduced is to be found). In fact, there are 
games where the only plausible agreements are correlated (and not mixed) 
agreements. We provide examples with this feature and we show that the 
notion of coalition-proof equilibrium that we propose identifies these 
agreements. Unfortunately, as with other notions of coalition proofness 
previously introduced, the existence of an equilibrium cannot be guaran-
teed. We are able to establish, however, that if there is a correlated 
strategy which (i) has a support contained in the set of actions that survive 
the iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies, and (ü) weakly 
Pareto dominates every other correlated strategy whose support is con-
tained in that set, then this strategy is a coalition-proof equilibrium. 
Consequently, the unique equilibrium of a dominance solvable game is 
coalition-proof. 
Other authors have explored the implications of preplay communication 
when agreements are mixed strategy profiles. Aumann (1959) introduced 
the notion of strong Nash equilibrium, which requires that an agreement 
not be subject to an improving deviation by any coalition of players. This 
requirement is too strong, since agreements must be resistant to deviations 
which are not themselves resistant to further deviations. Recognizing this 
problem, Bernheim, Peleg, and Whinston (1987) (henceforth referred to as 
BPW) introduced the notion of coalition-proof Nash equilibrium (CPNE), 
which requires only that an agreement be immune to improving deviations 
which are self-enforcing. A deviation is self-enforcing if there is no further 
self-enforcing and improving deviation available to a proper subcoalition 
of players. This notion of self-enforceability provides a useful means of 
distinguishing coalitional deviations that are viable from those that are not 
resistant to further deviations. Only viable deviations can upset potential 
agreements. A deficiency of CPNE, however, is that it does not aHow 
players to agree to correlate their play. 
Although the possibility that players correlate their actions when given 
the opportunity to communicate was recognized as early as in Luce and 
Raiffa (1957), only recently did Einy and Peleg (1995) (E & P) introduce a 
concept of coalition-proof communication equilibrium. The difference 
between E & P's notion and ours can be better understood if we assume 
that correlated agreements are carried out with the assistance of a media-
3toro The mediator selects an action profile according to the agreement and 
then makes a (private and nonbinding) recommendation of an action to 
each player. 
E & P consider situations where the players may plan deviations only 
after receiving recommendations. In our framework, however, players plan 
deviations before receiving recommendations, and no further communica-
tion is possible after recommendations are issued. This difference mani-
fests itself most clearly in two-person games where an agreement is 
coalition-proof in our sense only if it is Pareto-efficient within the set of 
correlated equilibria, while an agreement that is coalition-proof in E & P's 
sense need not be. We provide an example with this feature in Section 4. 
The second difference is that in our framework deviations may involve the 
members of a coalition jointly "misreporting" their types, while this 
possibility is not considered by E & P's notion. In Section 4 these differ-
ences are discussed in detail. 
Ray (1996) proposes a notion of coalition-proof correlated equilibrium 
in which the players' possibilities of correlating their play are limited by an 
exogenously given co"elation device, and he shows that there are 
coalition-proof equilibria which cannot be attained by means of direct 
devices (Le., devices in which players' messages are their action spaces). 
This finding raises the question whether aHowing nondirect devices might 
alter the coalition-proof correlated equilibria (CPCE) of a game when, as 
in our definition, players' possibilities of correlating their play are not 
exogenously given. We do not have a general answer to this question. For 
games which satisfy the sufficient conditions we provide for exi~tence of a 
unique CPCE, however, the set of equilibria we identify as coalition-proof 
is the same regardless of whether or not nondirect devices are available to 
the players. 
As the foHowing example illustrates, correlated play naturaHy arises 
when communication is possible (and regardless of whether or not players 
have access to a correlation device). Therefore one should take the set of 
correlated strategies as the set of feasible agreements, and one must 
consider deviations that involve correlated play by members of a deviating 
coalition. 
Three-Player Matching Pennies Game (TPMPG). Three players each 
simultaneously choose heads or tails. If aH three faces match, then players 
1 and 2 each win a penny while player 3 loses two pennies. Otherwise, 
player 3 wins two pennies while players 1 and 2 each lose a penny. 
The matrix representation of this game is given in Table 1. This game 
has two pure-strategy and one mixed-strategy Nash equilibria: one pure-
4TABLE 1 
The Three-Player Matching Pennies Garne 
H3 T3 
H2 T2 T2 H2 
H¡ 1,1, -2 -1, -1,2 -1, -1,2 -1, -1,2 
T¡ -1, -1,2 -1, -1,2 -1, -1,2 1,1, -2 
strategy equilibrium consists of players 1 and 2 each choosing heads (tails) 
and player 3 choosing tails (heads). In the mixed strategy equilibrium each 
player chooses heads with probability t. 
The game does not have a CPNE, as each of the Nash equilibria is upset 
by a deviation of the coalition of players 1 and 2; in the pure-strategy Nash 
equilibrium where players 1 and 2 both choose heads, they each obtain a 
payoff of - 1. By jointIy deviating (both choosing tails instead) players 1 
and 2 each obtain a payoff of 1. This deviation is self-enforcing as players 1 
and 2 each obtain their highest possible payoffs and therefore neither 
player can improve by a further unilateral deviation. (A symmetric argu-
ment shows that the other pure-strategy Nash equilibrium is not a CPNE 
either.) In the mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium, players 1 and 2 each 
obtain an expected payoff of - t. This equilibrium is not a CPNE as 
players 1 and 2 can jointly deviate (both choosing heads instead) and 
obtain a payoff of zero. This deviation is self-enforcing, since given that 
pI ayer 3 chooses heads or tails with equal probability, neither player can 
obtain more than zero by a further deviation. Since a CPNE must be a 
Nash equilibrium, this game has no CPNE. 
Nevertheless, the game does have an agreement that is resistant to 
improving deviations. This agreement is the correlated strategy where with 
probability ~ players 1 and 2 both choose heads and with probability ~ 
both choose tails, and player 3 chooses heads or tails with equal probabil-
ity. Under this agreement each player has an expected payoff of zero. No 
single player can deviate and improve upon this agreement: neither player 
1 nor player 2 can benefit by unilaterally deviating, as they both lose a 
penny whenever their faces do not match. Neither do es player 3 benefit 
from deviating: given the probability distribution over the moves of players 
1 and 2, he is indifferent between heads and tails. Moreover, since the 
interests of players 1 and 2 are completely opposed to those of player 3, no 
coalition involving player 3 can improve upon the given agreement. Final1y, 
given player 3's strategy, players 1 and 2 obtain at most a payoff of zero, 
and therefore they cannot benefit by deviating. Hence, no coalition can 
gain by deviating from the agreement. 
5TABLE II 
An Entry Game 
Enter Not enter 
Enter -2, -2 1, -1 
Not enter -1,1 0,0 
Notice that the agreement described aboye is not a mixed strategy 
profile and so it cannot possibly be a CPNE. As we shall see, however, 
when we expand the space of agreements to inelude all the correlated 
strategies, this agreement is the unique coalition-proof equilibrium of the 
game. (See Moreno and Wooders, 1995, for an experimental study of tbis 
game.) 
The possibility of players correlating their play arises even when commu-
nication is limited. Consider, for instance, the game described in Table II 
which is related to a elass of games discussed in Farrell (1987); in this 
game two identical firms must simultaneously decide whether to enter a 
market which is a natural monopoly. This game has three Nash equilibria: 
(Enter, Not enter), (Not enter, Enter), and a mixed-strategy Nash equilib-
rium where each firm enters the market with probability ~. Each of these 
Nash equilibria is also a CPNE. 
Although the mixed Nash equilibrium is a CPNE, it is not resistant to 
improving deviations given the possibility of preplay communication. The 
firms can improve by augmenting the game with a round of cheap talk. In 
the game with cheap talk each firm simultaneously and publiely announces 
whether it intends to "Enter" or "Not enter" the market. Following the 
announcements each firm makes its choice. 
Suppose the firms agree to play the following Nash (and subgame 
perfect) equilibrium of the game with cheap talk. Each firm announces 
"Enter" with probability %. If the profile of announcements is either 
(Enter, Not enter) or (Not enter, Enter), then each firm plays its an-
nouncement. Otherwise, each firm plays "Enter" with probability ~. This 
equilibrium yields an expected payoff for each firm of - -ft while in the 
mixed N ash equilibrium of the original game each firm has an expected 
payoff of only - ~. 
Preplay communication has enabled the firms to correlate their play. In 
this Nash equilibrium of the cheap talk game the firms effectively play the 
correlated strategy (of the original game) given in Table III. This joint 
probability distribution is not the product of its marginal distributions and 
therefore cannot be obtained from a mixed strategy profile of the game 
6TABLE III 
The Correlated Strategy Induced by "Cheap Talk" 
Enter 
Notenter 
Enter Not enter 
s 
32 
11 
32 
11 
32 
5 
32 
without communication. This "correlated deviation" from the mixed strat-
egy equilibrium makes both firms better off. Moreover, it is a self-en-
forcing deviation since it is a correlated equilibrium of the original game. 
Expanding the set of fe asible agreements from the mixed strategies (as 
in CPNE) to the set of correlated strategies does not lead simply to an 
expansion of the set of coalition-proof agreements. In the Three-Player 
Matching Pennies game we found a coalition-proof agreement where no 
CPNE existed. In the entry game we found a CPNE that was not 
coalition-proof. Thus, there is no inclusion between the set of CPNE and 
the set of equilibria that are coalition-proof in our sense. 
In our framework the primitives are a set of feasible agreements and the 
concepts of fe asible deviation and of self-enforcing deviation by a coalition 
from a given agreement. The set of feasible deviations by a coalition from 
a given agreement is the set of all correlated strategies that the coalition 
can induce when the complementary coalition behaves according to the 
given agreement and when the members of the coalition correlate their 
play. The definition of a self-enforcing deviation is recursive. For a 
coalition of a single player any fe asible deviation is self-enforcing. For 
coalitions of more than one player, a deviation is self-enforcing if it is 
fe asible and if there is no further self-enforcing and improving deviation 
by one of its proper subcoalitions. With these concepts, our notion of 
coalition-proofness is easily formulated; an agreement is coalition-proof if 
no coalition (not even the grand coalition) has a self-enforcing deviation 
that makes all its members better off. 
Our notion of a self-enforcing deviation coincides with that implicit in 
the concept of CPNE. The difference between our notion of coalition-
proofness and CPNE is only that we take the set of correlated strategies as 
the space of feasible agreements. For games of complete information, if 
feasible agreements are mixed strategies then our definition of coalition-
proofness coincides with CPNE. (This is established in Appendix B.) In 
sorne situations it may be natural to restrict the space of feasible agree-
ments (e.g., if communication is limited) or to limit the possibilities of 
players to form deviations. The framework we propose easily accommo-
dates these kinds of changes. 
7In fact, our existence results are easily modified to provide conditions 
for the existence of a CPNE; namely, any mixed strategy profile whose 
support is contained in the set of action profiles that survive iterated 
elimination of strictly dominated strategies and which weakly Pareto-
dominates any other mixed strategy profile whose support is contained in 
this set is a CPNE. For games with strategic complementarities, Milgrom 
and Roberts (1994) have independently obtained analogous results. 
The paper is organized as follows: in Section 1 we discuss our framework 
and define our notion of equilibrium for games of complete information. 
In Section 2 we establish conditions for existence of these equilibria and 
show by means of an example that an equilibrium does not always exist. In 
Section 3 we extend the concept of coalition-proofness to games of 
incomplete information. Of course, the notion of coalition-proof equilib-
rium for games of incomplete information reduces to that formulated for 
games of complete information when every player has a single type. We 
present separately the notion of coalition-proofness for games of complete 
information, as the notion's simplicity in this context facilitates the discus-
sion and because we want to stress the fact that our notion of coalition-
proofness can be formulated without resorting to games of incomplete 
information. In Section 4 we compare our notion of coalition-proof equi-
librium and E & P's notion of coalition-proof communication equilibrium, 
and we present sorne concluding remarks. 
1. GAMES OF COMPLETE INFORMATION 
A game in strategic form r is defined as 
where N is the set of players, and for each i E N, Ai is player i's set of 
actions (or pure strategies) and u i is player i's utility (payoff) function, a 
real-valued function on A = IIi E NAi' Assume that N and A are nonempty 
and finite. For any finite set Z, denote by ll.Z the set of probability 
distributions over Z. In particular, denote by ll.A the set of probability 
distributions over A, and refer to its members as co"elated strategies. 
Given a correlated strategy ¡..t, player i's expected utility when players' 
actions are selected according to ¡..t is 
0;( ¡..t) = E ¡..t(a)ui(a). 
aEA 
A coalition of players S is a member of 2N• When S consists of a single 
player i E N, we write it as "i" rather than the more cumbersome {i}. For 
8each S E 2N, S*- 0, denote by As the set n¡ESA¡. Given a EA, we 
write a = (as, a_s), where as E As and a_s E A_s. If S = N, then 
(as, a_s) = as = a. 
Coalition-Proof Correlated Equilibrium 
We conceive of communication and playas proceeding in two stages. In 
the first stage players communicate, reaching an agreement and possibly 
planning deviations from the agreement. Given an agreement JL E aA, 
the players implement it with the assistance of a mediator who recom-
mends the action profile a E A with probability JL(a). In the second stage, 
each player privately receives his component of the recommendation and 
then chooses an action. (No further communication occurs in this stage.) 
A deviation by a coalition is a plan for its members to correlate their 
play in a way different from that prescribed by the agreement. We take a 
broad view of the ability of coalitions to plan deviations; for every different 
profile of recommendations received by its members, a deviating coalition 
may plan a different correlated strategy. Therefore, a deviation for a 
coalition S is a mapping from the set As of profiles of recommendations 
for its members to the set aAs of probability distributions over the set of 
the coalition's action profiles. 
Given an agreement Ji, if a coalition S plans to deviate according to T/s: 
As - aAs , and if the members of the complement of S play their part of 
the agreement, Le., they obey their recommendations, then the induced 
probability distribution over action profiles for the grand coalition is given 
for each a E A by 
JL(a) = L, Ji(aS,a_S)T/s(aslas)· 
asEAs 
It will be convenient to define the fe asible deviations for coalition S as 
those correlated strategies JL E A which the coalition can induce, rather 
than as mappings from As to aAs. Thus, a correlated strategy is a 
feasible deviation by coalition S from a given agreement if the members of 
S, using sorne plan to correlate their play, can induce the correlated 
strategy when each member of the complementary coalition obeys his 
recommendation. 
DEFINITION 1.1. Let Ji E aA and S E 2N , S *- 0. We say that JL E aA 
is a feasible deviation by coalition S from Ji if there is an T/s: As - aAs, 
such that for all a EA we have JL(a) = LasEAsJi(aS,a-s)T/ias las). 
We illustrate our definition of a feasible deviation by describing a 
procedure that can be thought of as mimicking the process by which 
players select agreements and plan deviations. Given an agreement Ji, 
9suppose that the mediator implementing Ji mails to each player a sealed 
envelope containing the player's recommendation. A coalition S deviates 
from Ji by employing a new mediator to which each member of S sends 
the (unopened) envelop it received from the mediator implementing Ji. 
The new mediator opens the envelops, reads the recommendations as, 
and then selects a new profile of recommendations according to the 
correlated strategy 71sC as). The mediator then mails to each player i E S a 
sealed envelope containing his recommended action. When each player 
opens his envelope and obeys the recommendation it contains, the induced 
correlated strategy is given by the equation in Definition 1.1. 
Given a coalition S E 2N, S*- 0, and an agreement IL E aA, let 
D( IL, S) denote the set of feasible deviations by coalition S from IL; note 
that IL E D( IL, S), since a coalition always has the trivial "deviation" 
consisting of each member of the coalition obeying his own recommenda-
tion. Also note that for every IL E aA, we have D( IL, N) = aA. A 
correlated equilibrium is a correlated strategy from which no individual 
has a fe asible improving deviation. 
eo"elated Equilibrium. A correlated strategy IL is a co"elated equilib-
rium if no individual i E N, has a feasible deviation jL E D( IL, 0, such that 
U;C jL) > U¡( IL)· 
The definition of strong Nash equilibrium suggests the following defini-
tion of strong correlated equilibrium1: a strong correlated equilibrium is a 
correlated strategy from which no coalition has a deviation which makes 
every member of the coalition better off. 
DEFINITION 1.2. A correlated strategy IL E aA is a strong co"elated 
equilibrium if no coalition S E 2 N, S '* 0, has a feasible deviation jL E 
D( IL, S), such that for each i E S, we have U¡( jL) > U¡( IL). 
The agreement described in the introduction for the Three-Player Match-
ing Pennies game is, for example, the unique strong correlated equilibrium 
of that game. Like strong Nash equilibrium, the notion of strong corre-
lated equilibrium is too strong. A strong correlated equilibrium must be 
resistant to any feasible deviation by any coalition. In particular, it must 
be resistant to deviations which are not themselves resistant to further 
deviations. Consider, for example, the Prisoners' Dilemma game described 
in Table IV. This game has a unique correlated equilibrium where (D, D) 
is played with probability one. This correlated equilibrium is not a strong 
correlated equilibrium since the correlated strategy jL consisting of playing 
(e, e) with probability one is a fe asible deviation which makes both 
players better off. Since a strong correlated equilibrium must be a corre-
1 A notion of strong correlated equilibrium was informally proposed in Moulin (1981). 
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TABLE IV 
A Prisoners' Dilemma Garne 
e D 
e 1,1 -1,2 
D 2, -1 0,0 
lated equilibrium, tbis game has no strong correlated equilibrium. Notice, 
however, that either player can unilaterally deviate from ÍL and increase 
his payoff. Hence ÍL should not undermine an agreement to play (D, D) 
with probability one. 
In order to be able to distinguish those deviations that are viable from 
those that are not (and which therefore should not upset an agreement as 
coalition-proof) we introduce the notion of self-enforcing deviation; a 
correlated strategy ¡.L is a self-enforcing deviation by coalition S from 
correlated strategy Ji if ¡.L is a fe asible deviation and if no proper 
subcoalition of S has a further self-enforcing and improving deviation. 
This notion of self-enforceability is identical to the one implicit in the 
concept of CPNE. 
DEFINITION 1.3. Let Ji E áA and S E 2N , S *" 0. The set of self-en-
forcing deviations by coalition S from Ji, SED( Ji, S), is defined, recursively, 
as follows: 
(i) If ISI = 1, then SED(Ji, S) = D(Ji, S); 
(ii) If ISI > 1, then SED( Ji, S) = {¡.L E D( Ji, S) I ~ [R E 2s "S, R 
*" 0, ÍL E SED( ¡.L, R)] such that Vi E R: U¡( ÍL) > U¡( ¡.L)}. 
Since a coalition consisting of a single player has no proper (nonempty) 
subcoalitions, any feasible deviation by a one-player coalition is self-en-
forcing. With this notion of a self-enforcing deviation, a coalition-proof 
correlated equilibrium is defined to be a correlated strategy from which no 
coalition has a self-enforcing and improving deviation. 
DEFINITION 1.4. A correlated strategy ¡.L is a coalition-proof correlated 
equilibrium (CPCE) if no coalition S E 2N , S *" 0, has a deviation ÍL E 
SED( ¡.L, S), such that for each i E S, we ha:ve U¡( ÍL) > U¡( ¡.L). 
It is clear that a strong correlated equilibrium is a coalition-proof 
correlated equilibrium, which in tum is a correlated equilibrium. For 
two-player games the set of coalition-proof correlated equilibria is the set 
of correlated equilibria which are not strongly Pareto-dominated by other 
correlated equilibria (i.e., ¡.L is a CPCE if it is a correlated equilibrium, and 
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there is no other correlated equilibrium Ji such that U¡( Ji) > U¡( JL) for 
each i E N). Thus, for two-player games, the set of coalition-proof corre-
lated equilibria is nonempty. Although existence of a CPCE cannot be 
guaranteed in general games, in the next section we identify conditions 
under which a CPCE exists. 
2. EXISTENCE OF CPCE AND CPNE 
In this section we show that a CPCE (CPNE) exists whenever there is a 
correlated (mixed) strategy whose support is contained in the set of action 
proilles that survive iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies 
and which weakly Pareto-dominates every other correlated (mixed) strat-
egy whose support is contained in this set. First, we define formally the 
notion of strict dominance. 
DEFINITION 2.1. Let B = n¡ENB¡ cA. An action aj E Bj is said to be 
strictly dominated in B, if there is Oj E b. Bj such that for each a _ j E B _ j' 
I: Oj(aj)uj(aj,a_ j) > uj(aj,a_ j). 
ajEBj 
Note that if aj is strictly dominated in B, then it is also strictly 
dominated in A j X B _ j. The set of action profiles that survive iterated 
elimination of strictly dominated strategies, which we write as A oo, is now 
easily defined. 
DEFINITION 2.2. The set A oo of action pro files that survive the iterated 
elimination of strictly dominated strategies is defined by Aoo = n¡ E NA7, 
where each A7 = n ~ ~ o A 7, A 7 is the set of actions that are not strictly 
dominated in A n - 1 = n¡ENA7-1, and A? =A¡. 
The following proposition establishes that if JL is a correlated strategy 
whose support is contained in A oo, then the support of every self-enforcing 
deviation from JL by a coalition of more than one player is also contained 
in A oo • For each JL E b.A and S E 2N, S =1= 0, write At( JL) for the set 
{as E As I JL(as, a_s) > O for sorne a_s E A_s}, and write A +( JL) for the 
set At( JL). 
PROPOSITION. Let JL E b.A be such that A+( JL) eAoo , and let S E 2N 
be a coalition ofmore than one playero Jf ÍL E SED( JL, S), thenA +( ÍL) e AOO • 
Proof. Let S and JL E b.A be as in the proposition, and let ÍL E 
SED( JL, S). By the definition of feasible deviation (Definition 1.1) A +( f.t) 
eAs XA':.s. We show that in fact A+(ÍL) eAoo • Suppose by way of 
contradiction that At( ÍL) is not contained in A~. Let n* be the largest n 
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such that A;(jL) cAso Hence there is j E S and aj EAt(jL) such that 
aj is strictly dominated in A
n
*. Thus aj is also strictly dominated in 
Aj X A~.*j; i.e., there is Uj E aAj such that for each a_j E A~*j, 
L Oj(aj)uj(aj , a_ j ) > uj(aj , a_J. 
a¡EA¡ 
Consider the deviation ¡i by player j (a proper subcoalition of S) from 
jL, where player j chooses an action according to Oj when recommended 
aj and takes the recommended action otherwise. Formally, t
he deviation l1j 
is defined as follows: for each aj E Aj such that aj =1= aj , let l1j(aj I aj) = 1 
if aj = aj , and l1/aj I aj) = O if aj =1= aj ; for aj == aj , let l1/aj I aj ) = Oj(aj ). 
Again by the definition of fe asible deviation A +( ¡i) c Aj X A~*j; then 
~(¡i) = L ¡i(a)uj(a) = L n'( L jL(aj,a_j)r¡iajlaj))Uj(a). 
aEA aEA¡xA_¡ <>¡EA¡ 
Substituting l1j as defined aboye we have 
~(¡i) = L jL(a)uj(a) 
aE(A¡,-{a))XA".*¡ 
Since jL(aj, a_ j ) > O for some a_j E A~j' Eq. (*) implies 
~(¡i) > L jL(a)uj(a) + L jL(aj , a_Juj(aj , a_j ); 
aE(A¡'-{a))XA".*¡ aE{a¡}XA".~ 
i.e., 
~(¡i) > L jL(a)uj(a) = ~(jL). 
aEA 
Hence ¡i is an improving and self-enforcing deviation from jL by player 
j (recall that every fe asible deviation by a single player is self-enforcing). 
Thus, jL is not a self-enforcing deviation by S from p.,; i.e., jL $ SED( p." S). 
This contradiction establishes that A + ( jL) cA"". • 
The following corollary establishes that if a correlated strategy p., whose 
support is contained in A'" weakly Pareto-dominates every other corre-
lated strategy jL whose support is contained in A"" (i.e., U¡( p.,) ;::: U¡( jL), for 
each i E N), then p., is a CPCE. 
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COROLLARY. Let ¡..t E .lA be such that A +( ¡..t) e Aoo and such that it 
weakly Pareto-dominates every other jí, E a A for which A + ( jí,) e A oo • Then 
¡..t is a CPCE. 
Proof. Let ¡..t be as in the corollary. We show that ¡..t is a CPCE. It is 
easy to show that no single player has a feasible and improving deviation 
from ¡..t. If a player j has an improving deviation jí, from ¡..t, then he also 
has an improving deviation ji from ¡..t such that A + ( ji) e A oo • Since ¡..t 
weakly Pareto-dominates every correlated strategy whose support is con-
tained in A oo, such a deviation ji cannot exist. Moreover, neither does a 
coalition of more than one player have a self-enforcing and improving 
deviation, since the support of every self-enforcing deviation from '¡..t by 
such a coalition is contained in Aoo by the proposition aboye. Hence ¡..t is a 
CPCE. • 
In Appendix B we show that the set of CPNE of a game can be 
characterized as the set of mixed strategies from which no coalition has a 
self-enforcing deviation which makes all its members better off. The 
proposition aboye is easily modified to show that if (J' is a mixed strategy 
profile whose support is contained in A oo, then any self-enforcing mixed 
deviation from (J' by a coalition of more than one player also has its 
support contained in A oo• Thus, the corollary aboye establishes conditions 
under which a CPNE exists; whenever there is a mixed strategy profile 
whose support is contained in Aoo and which weakly Pareto-dominates 
every other mixed strategy whose support is contained in A oo, then this 
strategy is a CPNE. 
In fact, the existence of a correlated strategy ¡..t whose support is 
contained in Aoo and which weakly Pareto-dominates every other corre-
lated strategy whose support is also contained in Aoo implies the existence 
of an action profile a E Aoo which weakly Pareto-dominates every action 
profile in Aoo (Le" such that for each i E N and each a' E A oo , u¡(a) ;::: 
u¡(a')). This action profile is therefore a (pure strategy) coalition-proof 
correlated (and Nash) equilibrium. Thus, the conditions that guarantee the 
existence of a CPCE alSO imply existence of a CPNE. 
An obvious implication of our corollary is that the unique equilibrium of 
a dominance solvable game (Le., a game for which the set Aoo is a 
singleton) is the unique CPCE (and CPNE) of the game. Also if a 
correlated strategy ¡..t whose support is contained in Aoo strongly Pareto-
dominates every other strategy whose support is contained in Aoo , then ¡..t 
is the unique CPCE of the game (as any other correlated equilibrium will 
be upset by the deviation of the grand coalition in which players ignore 
their recommendations and play according to ¡..t). 
It is worth noticing that the equilibria characterized by our corollary are 
strong in the sense that any improving deviation by a coalition of players is 
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"upset" by a further deviation by a single playero Milgrom and Roberts 
(1994) refer to such equilibria as strongly coalition-proof. They provide 
conditions that guarantee the existence of these equilibria in games with 
strategic complementarities. Specifically, they show that if a game with 
strategic complementarities has a unique Nash equilibrium, then this 
equilibrium is the unique strongly coalition-proof equilibrium of the game 
(Theorem 1); if each player's payoff function is increasing (respectively, 
decreasing) in the other players' strategies, then the maximal (respectively, 
minima}) Nash equilibrium is the unique strongly coalition-proof equilib-
rium (Theorem 2). Milgrom and Roberts establish their results using 
Tarski's fixed point theorem, and they do not rely on dominance argu-
ments. 
For games with finite strategy spaces, Milgrom and Roberts's results are 
implied by our corollary: if a game with strategic complementaries has a 
unique Nash equilibrium, then it is dominance solvable2 ; hence, this 
equilibrium is the unique (strongly) coalition-proof Nash equilibrium. 
Moreover, if each player's payoff function is increasing (respectively, 
decreasing) in the other players' strategies, then the maximal (respectively, 
minima}) N ash equilibrium weakly Pareto-dominates every other strategy 
whose support is contained in A oc, and therefore our Corollary implies that 
this equilibrium is a (strongly) coalition-proof Nash equilibrium. Of course, 
the equilibria identified by these conditions are also (strongIy) coalition-
proof correlated equilibria. 
A Game Where a CPCE Does Not Exist 
Unfortunately, as the following example shows, there are games with 
more than two players with no coalition-proof correlated equilibria. Con-
sider the three-player game given in Table V, taken from Einy and Peleg, 
where player 1 chooses the row, player 2 chooses the column, and player 3 
chooses the matrix. 
TABLE V 
A Game Where a CPCE Does Not Exist 
c¡ C2 
b¡ b2 b¡ b2 
a¡ 3,2,0 0,0,0 3,2,0 0,3,2 
a2 2,0,3 2,0,3 0,0,0 0,3,2 
2 See Milgrom and Shannon's (1994) Theorem 12. 
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We show that there does not exist a coalition-proof correlated equilib-
rium of this game. Let Ji be an arbitrary correlated equilibrium and 
suppose that player 1 has the lowest payoff of the three players. Then 
U/Ji) ~ lf. (This can be proven by maximizing player 3's utility over the 
set of correlated equilibria ¡L satisfying Ul ( ¡L) ~ max{Uz< ¡L), U/ ¡L)}.) 
Moreover, Ul ( Ji) ~ lf since player 1 has the lowest payoff. Now consider 
the following deviation from Ji by players 1 and 3: player 1 chooses the 
bottom row and player 3 chooses the left matrix. This deviation is improv-
ing as players 1 and 3 now receive payoffs of 2 and 3, respectively. To 
demonstrate that Ji is not a coalition-proof correlated equilibrium we 
need only show that this deviation is self-enforcing. Clearly player 3 does 
not deviate further as he now obtains 3, his highest possible payoff. It can 
be shown that player 1 obtains at most ~ by deviating further and choosing 
the top row? (The details of this calculation are in Appendix A) Thus, Ji 
is not a coalition-proof correlated equilibrium as players 1 and 3 have a 
self-enforcing and improving deviation. 
There was no loss of generality in assuming that player 1 has the lowest 
payoff. If player 2 has the lowest payoff, then there is a self-enforcing and 
improving deviation by players 2 and 1. If player 3 has the lowest payoff, 
then there is a self-enforcing and improving deviation by players 3 and 2. 
Since any correlated equilibrium has a self-enforcing deviation by two 
players which makes both players better off, this game has no coalition-
proof correlated equilibrium. (This game do es not have a CPNE either.) 
3. GAMES OF INCOMPLETE INFORMATION 
In this section we extend our notion of coalition proofness to games of 
incomplete information. A (finite) game of incomplete information (or 
Bayesian game) G is defined by 
where N is the set of players, and for each i E N, r; is the set of possible 
types for players i, A¡ is player i's action set, Pi: r; ~ llT _¡ is player i's 
prior probability distribution over the set of type profiles for the other 
players in the game (T _¡ = f1 j E N" (¡}~), and U¡: T X A ~ ~ is player i's 
3 Following the deviation by players 1 and 3, player 1 is choosing the bottom row with 
probability one. Hence, when considering a further deviation by player 1 there is no loss of 
generality in restricting attention to the deviation where he chooses the top row with 
probability one. If this deviation does not make him better off, then no deviation does. 
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utility (payoff) function (A = TI iE NAi, T = TI iE NT¡). We assume that the 
sets N, A, and Tare nonempty and finite. For every coalition of players 
S E 2N, S "" 0, we denote by Ts the set TI i E sT¡o 
A correlated strategy is a function ¡.L: T ~ AA. We let e denote the set 
of all correlated strategies. Given ¡.L E e, if each player reports his type 
truthfully and obeys his recommendation, then player i's expected payoff 
when he is of type ti E T¡ is 
U¡(¡.Llti)= E EPi(t_ilt;)¡.L(alt)ui(a,t). 
t_¡ET_ i aEA 
Notice that in order for the players to play according to a correlated 
strategy, information about the players' types must be revealed so that an 
action profile can be selected according to the probability distribution 
specified by the given correlated strategy. We therefore must allow devia-
tions by a coalition in which the players reveal a type profile different from 
their true one, as well as deviations where the players take actions 
different from those recommended. In the conceptual framework of medi-
ation, the members of a coalition can deviate from a correlated strategy Ji 
by misreporting their type profile to the mediator or by disobeying the 
mediator's recommendations. 
Intuitively, a deviation can be conceived of as follows: a coalition S 
carries out a deviation by employing a new mediator who represents the 
coalition with the mediator implementing ¡.L and with whom the members 
of S communicate. Each member of S reports his type to this mediator 
who then (1) selects according to sorne fs: Ts ~ ATs a type profile for the 
coalition (which he reports to the mediator implementing ¡.L) and, upon 
receiving from the mediator implementing ¡.L the recommendations for the 
members of S, (2) selects according to sorne 'T/s: Ts X Ts X As ~ AAs an 
action profile (which he recommends to the coalition members). The 
action profile recommended by the new mediator depends upon the type 
profile reported to it, the type pro file it reported to the mediator imple-
menting ¡.L, and the actions recommended by the mediator implementing 
¡.L. This deviation generates a new correlated strategy which can be 
calculated from fs and 'T/s according to the formula given in Definition 3.l. 
DEFINlTION 3.1. Let Ji E e and S E 2N , S "" 0. A correlated strategy 
¡.L is a feasible deviation by coalition S from Ji if there are fs: Ts ~ ATs and 
'T/s: Ts X Ts X As ~ AAs, such that for each tE T and each a E A, 
¡.L(alt) = E E fS(TS Its)Ji(us,a-sl Ts,t_s)'T/s(asl Ts,ts ' us)· 
TsETs asEAs 
The set of fe asible deviations by coalition S from a correlated strategy is 
the set of correlated strategies that the coalition can induce by means of 
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sorne fs and r¡s. Given JL E C and S E 2N , S =1= 0, denote by D( JL, S) the 
set of all fe asible deviations by coalition S from correlated strategy JL. As 
in Section 1, for every JL E C and S E 2N , we have JL E D( JL, S) and 
D(JL, N) = C. 
For expositional ease, we explicitly introduce a concept of Pareto-domi-
nance: a correlated strategy jL Pareto-dominates another correlated strat-
egy JL for coalition S if no member of S is worse off under jL than under JL 
for any type profile and if for at least one type profile every member of S 
is better off under jL than under JL. 
DEFINffiON 3.2. Let S E 2N, S =1= 0, and let JL, jL E C. We say that jL 
Pareto-dominates JL for coalition S (or that jL Pareto S-dominates JL) if (3.1) 
and (3.2) below are satisfied. 
For each i E S and each ti E 1';: U¡( jL I t¡) ;;:: U¡( JL I t;). (3.1) 
For each i E S and sorne ti E 1';: U¡( jL I ti) > U¡( JL I ti)' (3.2) 
In our framework, the notion of Pareto dominance used determines 
whether a deviation is an improvement for a coalition. Consequently, 
alternative notions of Pareto dominance will lead to different notions of 
coalition-proof communication equilibrium. There are two alternative no-
tions worth considering. 
We say that jL weakly Pareto S-domina tes JL if no member of S is worse 
off under jL than under JL for any of his types (i.e., if (3.1) is satisfied), and 
if at least one member of S is better off under jL than under JL for one of 
his types O.e., if (3.2) is satisfied for sorne i E S rather than for aH i E S). 
The notion of weak Pareto dominance does not seem appropriate; an 
agreement wiH be ruled out if a coalition has a self-enforcing deviation 
which makes only a proper subset of its members better off, even though 
there are not clear incentives for such a coalition to formo 
We say that jL strongly Pareto S-dominates JL if each member of S is 
better off under jL than under JL for each of his types O.e., if the 
inequalities (3.1) are satisfied with strict inequality). Strong Pareto domi-
nance is sometimes too strong. For example, if the utility function of sorne 
player is constant for one of his types, then there is no deviation which is 
improving for this playero Usingstrong Pareto dominance rules out the 
possibility of this player participating in any deviation. 
It is easy to see that a correlated strategy JL is a communication 
equilibrium if no single player i E N has a fe asible deviation which Pareto 
i-dominates JL.4 In the spirit of the notion of strong Nash equilibrium, a 
4 See Forges (1986) or Myerson (1986) for a definition of cornrnunication equilibriurn. 
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strong communication equilibrium can be defined as follows: A correlated 
strategy ¡.L is a strong communication equilibrium if no coalition S has a 
fe asible deviation which Pareto S-dominates ¡.L. We only want to require, 
however, that an agreement not be Pareto-dominated by self-enforceability 
deviations. The notion of self-enforceability we define is identical to that 
introduced in Section 1. 
DEFINITION 3.3. Let -¡i E e and S E 2N, S *- 0. The set of self-en-
forcing deviations by coalition S from -¡i, SED( -¡i, S), is defined, recursively, 
as follows: 
(i) If ISI = 1, then SED( -¡i, S) = D( -¡i, S); 
(ii) If ISI > 1, then SED( -¡i, S) = {¡.L E D( -¡i, S) I t1 [R E 2s "S, R 
*- 0, ¡¡ E SED( ¡.L, R)] such that ¡¡ Pareto R-dominates ¡.L}. 
With this notion of self-enforceability, a coalition-proof communication 
equilibrium is defined to be any correlated strategy ¡.L from which no 
coalition S has a self-enforcing deviation which Pareto S-dominates ¡.L. 
DEFINITION 3.4. A correlated strategy ¡.L is a coalition-proof communi-
cation equilibrium (CPCE) if no coalition S E 2N, S *- 0, has a deviation 
¡¡ E SED( ¡.L, S) such that ¡¡ Pareto S-dominates ¡.L. 
When the set of type profiles T is a singleton, the concepts of strong and 
coalition-proof communication equilibrium reduce to, respectively, strong 
and coalition-proof correlated equilibrium. Note that a strong communica-
tion equilibrium is a coalition-proof communication equilibrium, which in 
tum is a communication equilibrium. 
In two-player Bayesian games, the set of coalition-proof communication 
equilibria consists of the communication equilibria that are not Pareto 
N-dominated by any other communication equilibrium (i.e., the set of 
interim efficient communication equilibria).5 Hence, for two-player Bayesian 
games a CPCE always exists. As established by the example in Section 1, 
games with more than two players need not have a CPCE. 
4. DISCUSSION 
In this section we discuss the relation of CPCE to Einy and Peleg's 
notion of coalition-proof communication equilibrium (which we denote by 
CPCEEP )' and we present sorne concluding remarks. 
In CPCE deviations are evaluated prior to the players receiving recom-
mendations; a deviation is improving if it makes each member of the 
5 See Holmstrom and Myerson (1983). 
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TABLE VI 
The Game of Chicken 
L R 
T 6,6 2,7 
B 7,2 0,0 
TABLE VII 
Chicken: A CorreIated Equilibrium 
L R 
T 1/3 1/3 
B 1/3 o 
deviating coalition better off, conditional on his type, for at least one of his 
types and no worse off for any of his types. In contrast, in CPCEEP 
deviations are considered afier players receive recommendations; a devia-
tion is improving if it makes each member of the deviating coalition better 
off, conditional onboth his type and his recommendation, for each 
combination of types and recommendations that occur with positive proba-
bility. Consequently, for two person games, while a CPCE must be interim 
efficient a CPCEEP need not be. 
This is illustrated by the game Chicken given in Table VI. Table VII 
describes a correlated equilibrium of Chicken which yields an expected 
payoff of 5 for each player. This correlated strategy is not a CPCE as the 
grand coalition has the self-enforcing deviation given in Table VIII, which 
yields an expected payoff of 5.25 for each playero (This deviation is 
self-enforcing since it is a correlated equilibrium and therefore is immune 
to further deviations by a single player.) 
TABLE VIII 
Chicken: A Deviation by the Grand Coalition 
T 
B 
L 
1/2 
1/4 
R 
1/4 
o 
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Nonetheless, the correlated strategy given in Table VII is a CPCEEP ' In 
this game each player has only a single type; therefore, for a deviation to 
be improving in Einy and Peleg's sense, it must make each player better 
off, conditional on bis recommendation, for each of bis possible recom-
mendations. Consider player 1 given the recommendation B. His expected 
payoff conditional on his recommendation is 7. Since 7 is player l's highest 
possible payoff, no coalition involving player 1 can improve upon this 
strategy.6 
One interpretation of E & P's framework is that players have the oppor-
tunity to communicate only after each player has received his recommen-
dation. Thus, when determining whether or not an agreement is a CPCEEP ' 
the agreement is elevated to the position of a status quo agreement. It is 
required to be resistant to deviations following recommendations, but it is 
not confronted with alternative agreements which are improving at the 
stage prior to each player receiving his recommendation. If players have 
the opportunity to discuss their play prior to receiving recommendations, 
however, they will exhaust the opportunities for improvements at tbis 
stage. For the game Chicken, if the players must decide whether to play 
the strategy in Table VII or that of Table VIII, they should choose the 
latter as this strategy gives a higher expected payoff to each player, and it 
is also resistant to further deviations. 
The second fundamental way in wbich the notions of coalition proofness 
differ is that Einy and Peleg do not admit the possibility that members of a 
coalition jointly "misreport" their types. A CPCEEP must be a communica-
tion equilibrium, and so a CPCEEP is immune to deviations where a single 
player misreports his type and disobeys his recommendation. However, in 
Einy and Peleg's framework, at the stage where deviations are considered, 
the players are assumed to have already truthfully reported their types. 
Thus, deviations may not involve the members of a coalition jointly 
misreporting their types, or involve one member of a coalition misreport-
ing his type and another member of the coalition disobeying his recom-
mendation. An example of a CPCEEP wbich fails to be immune to this 
latter kind of deviation is illustrated in the game of incomplete informa-
tion below. The game is the same as the Three-Player Matching Pennies 
game (see Table 1), except that player l's moves have now become his 
types. This game is given in Table IX below. Player 1 now has two possible 
types {HI , TI} and no actions, while players 2 and 3 both have a singleton 
6 It can be shown that there is no improving deviation upon ¡¡ in E & P's sense even with 
the weaker requirement that a deviation makes each member of the deviating coalition better 
off for at least one recommendation and at least as well off for all recommendations. 
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TABLEIX 
An Incomplete Information Version of the TPMPG 
t¡ =H¡ t¡ = T¡ 
1,1, -2 -1, -1,2 -1, -1,2 -1, -1,2 
-1, -1,2 -1, -1,2 -1, -1,2 1,1, -2 
type set and their action sets remain, respectively, {Hz, Tz} and {H3, T3}. 
Assume that the priors of players 2 and 3 over player l's types are, 
respectively, Pz(HI ) = P3(HI ) = i. 
The correlated strategy J1. given by J1.(Hz, T31 H I ) = 1 and J1.(Tz, H31 TI) 
= 1, is a communication equilibrium of the game which yields expected 
payoffs of UI( J1.1 H I ) = UI( J1.1 TI) = -1, Uz( J1.) = -1, and U3( J1.) = 2. It 
is also a CPCEEP ; in E & P's framework, a deviation by a coalition is a 
mapping from the set of type and action (recommendation) profiles for the 
coalition to probability distributions over the coalition's set of action 
profiles. The coalition {l, 2} has no improving deviation since, if player 1 is 
of type H I , then player 3 moves T3 with probability one and players 1 and 
2 have a payoff of - 1 regardless of the action taken by player 2. By the 
same argument, the coalition cannot improve if player 1 is of type TI' No 
coalition involving player 3 has an improving deviation as the interests of 
players 1 and 2 are completely opposed to the interests of player 3. That 
no single player has an improving deviation follows from the fact that J1. is 
a communication equilibrium. 
In contrast, J1. is not a CPCE of the game. Consider the deviation by the 
coalition {l,2}, where player 1 reports TI when his type is HI and he 
reports HI when his type is TI' and where player 2 moves Hz when 
recommended Tz and moves Tz when recommended Hz. This deviation 
results in the correlated strategy {L given by {L(Hz, H31 H I ) = {L(Tz, T31 
TI) = 1, which yields expected payoffs of UI( J1.1 H I) = UI( J1.1 TI) = 1 and 
Uz( J1.) = 1. The deviation makes both players better off and is also 
self-enforcing (as both players attain their maximum possible payoff). 
Hence J1. is not a CPCE. 
Note that even if players can communicate only following the receipt of 
recommendations, CPCEEP assumes a certain myopia on the part of 
player 1. Consider again the CPCEEP of the Three-Player Matching Pennies 
game, where J1.(Hz, T31 H I ) = 1 and J1.(Tz, H31 TI) = 1. If player 1 is of 
type HI and if he anticipates the opportunity to communicate following 
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player 2's receipt of his recommendation, then player 1 should report type 
TI and, at the communication stage, suggest to player 2 that he should 
move H 2 • Player 2 should follow player 1's suggestion given that h
is 
interests are coincident with player 1's. 
This game has a unique CPCE (which is also a CPCEEP )' where player 3 
moves H3 with probability ~ regardless of player 1's type, and player 2 
moves H 2 when player 1's type is HI and moves T2 when player 1's type i
s 
TI. This is essentially the same agreement predicted for the complete 
information version of the game. In fact, given that the interests of players 
1 and 2 are coincident and opposed to those of player 3, this seems the 
only reasonable outcome. 
For the game of Chicken and the incomplete information version of the 
Three-Player Matching Pennies game we have found correlated strategies 
which are CPCEEP and which are not CPCE. For the CoordinationjDefec-
tion game in Appendix A we find a correlated strategy which is a CPCE 
and which is not a CPCEEp • Thus, there is no inc1usion relation between 
these two notions. 
We conc1ude by emphasizing our findings. First, we show that when 
players can communicate they will reach correlated agreements. For 
example, in the Three-Player Matching Pennies game the only intuitive 
agreement is a correlated (and not mixed) agreement. Second, we offer a 
natural definition of coalition-proof equilibrium when correlated agree-
ments are possible, and we show that no inc1usion relationship between 
this new notion and CPNE is to be found. (Consequently, the notion of 
coalition proofness is sensitive to the possibility of correlated agreements.) 
And third, we obtain conditions under which a coalition-proof equilibrium 
exists. 
APPENDIX A 
In this appendix we present three examples. The first example is a game 
that has no coalition-proof correlated equilibrium. The second example is 
the Three-Player Matching Pennies game; we show that the correlated 
strategy described in the Introduction is the unique coalition-proof corre-
lated equilibrium (and the unique strong correlated equilibrium) of the 
game. The third example is a game with a CPCE which is not a CPCEEP • 
A Game with No Coalition Proof Correlated Equilibrium 
We show that the game described in Table V has no coalition-proof 
correlated equilibrium. A correlated strategy for this game is a vector 
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/L = (/L¡jk)¡,j,kE{I,2l' where /L¡jk ~ o denotes the probability that players 1, 
2, and 3 are recommended, respectively, actions a¡, bj , and ek • 
If /L is a correlated equilibrium, then it satisfies the system of inequali-
ties (l) given by 
(l.ad /L111 - 2/Ll2l + 3/Lll2 ~ O 
(l.a 2 ) - /L2l1 + 2/L221 - 3/L212 ~ O 
(l.b l ) 2/L111 - /Lll2 - 3/L212 ~ O 
(l.b2) - 2/Ll2l + /L122 + 3/L222 ~ O 
(l.e l ) - 2/Ll2l + 3/L2l1 + /L221 ~ O 
(l.e2) 2/L122 - 3/L212 - /L222 ~ O 
We show that for each correlated equilibrium there is a coalition of two 
players which has an improving and self-enforcing deviation. Therefore, 
since a coalition-proof correlated equilibrium must be a correlated equilib-
rium, the set of CPCE of this game is empty. 
Let /i be an arbitrary correlated equilibrium and suppose that player 1 
has the lowest payoff of the three players. We show that the coalition of 
players 1 and 3 has a self-enforcing and improving deviation. If player 1 
has the lowest payoff in a correlated equilibrium, then player 3's payoff is 
no larger than 1f, which is the value of the solution to the linear 
programming problem 
We also have UI(/i) ~ t since player 1 has the lowest payoff. 
Consider the deviation jL induced by players 1 and 3 playing (a2' el) 
with probability one for each profile of recommendations. (Then ÍL211 = 
/Lll1 + /L211 + /Lll2 + /L212' ÍL221 = /Ll2l + /L221 + /L122 + /L222' and ÍL¡jk = 
O otherwise.) Given this deviation, players 1 and 3 obtain payoffs of, 
respectively, 2 and 3, regardless of player 2's action. Hence, UI( ÍL) = 2 > 
UI( /i) and U3( jL) = 3 > U3( /i) and so ÍL is an improving deviation for 
{l,3}. 
We now show that jL is self-enforcing. Clearly pI ayer 3 does not have a 
further improving deviation as he obtains his highest possible payoff. 
Player 1 has an improving deviation if the expected payoff of deviating to 
al' which is 3jL211' is greater than UI ( jL) = 2 (his expected payoff when he 
follows a recommendation to play a2 ). However, this payoff is not larger 
than t, which is the value of the solution to the linear programming 
24
problem 
max 3( JL111 + JL2l1 + JLl12 + JL212) 
¡.LEilA 
The value of the solution to this problem is the maximum payoff that 
player 1 can obtain by a further deviation to al from the correlated 
strategy ¡J., given that the original agreement JL was a correlated equilib-
rium in which player 1 had the lowest payoff. Hence, player 1 has no 
further improving deviation. 
There was no loss of generality in assuming that player 1 has the lowest 
payoff. Given the symmetry of this game, we can construct the following 
self-enforcing and improving deviations in each case: If player 2 has the 
lowest payoff, then players 1 and 2 deviate to {al' bl }. If player 3 has the 
lowest payoff, then players 2 and 3 deviate to {bz, cz}. Therefore, this game 
has no coalition-proof correlated equilibrium. 
Three-Player Matching Pennies 
In the Introduction we demonstrated that the correlated strategy JL* 
given in Table X below is a strong correlated equilibrium of the Three-
Player Matching Pennies game. We now establish that JL* is the unique 
coalition-proof correlated equilibrium of this game. (A strong correlated 
equilibrium is also a coalition-proof correlated equilibrium; therefore JL* 
is also the unique strong correlated equilibrium.) Let JL be any correlated 
strategy. We reduce notation by writing JLxyz for the probability 
JL(xI' Yz, z3)' where (xl' Yz, Z3) E {HI , TI} X {Hz, Tz} X {H3, T3}; e.g., we 
write JLTTH for JL(TI, Tz, H 3 ). If JL is a correlated equilibrium, then it must 
TABLE X 
The CPCE of the TPMPG 
H3 T3 
H 2 T2 T2 H 2 
H¡ 1 O 1 O ¡ ¡ 
T¡ O 1 O 1 ¡ ¡ 
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satisfy the system of inequalities (1) given by 
2¡.tHHH - 2¡.tHTT ~ O 
- 2¡.tTHH + 2¡.tTTT ~ O 
2¡.tHHH - 2¡.tTHT ~ O 
- 2¡.tHTH + 2¡.tTTT ~ O 
- 4¡.tHHH + 4¡.tTTH ~ O 
4¡.tHHT - 4¡.tTTT ~ O. 
(l.HI ) 
(l.T¡) 
(l.Hz) 
(l.Tz) 
(l.H3 ) 
(l.T3 ) 
Note that (1.H3) implies ¡.tTTH ~ ¡.tHHH and (1.T3) implies ¡.tHHT ~ ¡.tTTT' 
Hence player 3's payoff, 
U3( ¡.t) = 2( - ¡.tHHH + ¡.tHTH + ¡.tTHH + ¡.tTTH 
+ ¡.tHHT + ¡.tHTT + ¡.tTHT - ¡.tTTT) , 
satisfies U3( ¡.t) ~ O. Since for each (Xl' Yz, Z3) E {HI, TI} X {Hz, Tz} X 
{H3 , T3}, UI(XI , Yz, Z3) + UZ(xI' Yz, Z3) + U/Xl' Yz, Z3) = O, we have UI( ¡.t) 
= UzC ¡.t) :o:;; O. We now establish the following resulto 
CLAIM. Jf ¡.t is a CPCE, then UI( ¡.t) = UzC ¡.t) = O, and ¡.tHHH + ¡.tHTH 
1 
+ ¡.tTHH + ¡.tTTH = 2' 
Proof Let ¡.t be a coalition-proof correlated equilibrium. We have 
shown that in any correlated equilibrium UI( ¡.t) = Uz( ¡.t) ::;:; O. Suppose by 
way of contradiction that UI( ¡.t) = Uz( ¡.t) < O. Consider the deviation 
where players 1 and 2 play (HI, Hz) with probability t and (TI' Tz) with 
probability t, regardless of their recommendations. This deviation induces 
the correlated strategy 7i given in Table XI, where A = ¡.tHHH + ¡.tHTH + 
TABLE XI 
A Deviation from the CPCE of the TPMPG 
H3 T3 
H 2 T2 H 2 T2 
,\ 1-,\ 
H¡ -
2 
o --
2 
o 
,\ 1-,\ 
T¡ o - o --
2 2 
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JLTHH + JLTTH· This deviation is improving since Uk¡i) = U2(/i) = O. It is 
aIso self-enforcing since a further deviation by either pIayer 1 or 2 makes 
the pIayer strictIy worse off. The existence of such a deviation contradicts 
that JL is a CPCE. Thus, we must have U1( JL) = U2( JL) = O; Le., 
JLHHH - JLHTH - JLTHH - JLTTH - JLHHT - JLHTT - JLTHT + JLTTT = O. 
(2) 
We now show that A = t. Suppose that A > t. Then the deviation by 
pIayers 1 and 2, where, regardIess of their recommendation, they move 
(H1, H 2 ) with probabiIity one is improving (pIayers 1 and 2 each have an 
expected payoff of A + (1 - A) > O) and seIf-enforcing, contradicting that 
JL is a CPCE. The case A < t is symmetric. Therefore A = t; i.e., 
1 
JLHHH + JLHTH + JLTHH + JLTTH = 2· • (3) 
Finally, we show that if JL is a CPCE, then JLHHH = JLHHT = JLTTT = 
JLTTH = i-. As JL is a correIated strategy, we have 
JLHHH + JLHTH + JLTHH + JLTTH + JLHHT + JLHTT + JLTHT + JLTTT = l. 
Adding (2) and (4) we get 
1 
JLHHH + JLTTT = 2· 
(4) 
Also (l.H3 ) and (l.T3 ) yield JLTTH ~ JLHHH and JLHHH ~ JLTTT. Adding 
these two inequaIities and noticing (4), we get 
1 
JLTTH + JLHHT = 2· 
Thus, (4) impIies JLHTH = JLTHH = JLHTT = JLTHT = O. Substituting in (3) 
we get 
1 
JLHHH + JLTTH = 2· 
Subtracting (* * *) from (*) we get JLTTT - JLTTH = O; i.e., JLTTT = JLTTH· 
Substituting in ( * *) and subtracting (*), we have JLHHT - JLHHH = O; Le., 
JLHHT = JLHHH" Using (l.H3 ) and (l.T3) again implies 
JLHHH = JLHHT ~ JLTTT = JLTTH ~ JLHHH· 
Hence JLHHH = JLHHT = JLTTT = JLTTH = i-. • 
The Coordination / Defection Game 
In the Coordination / Defection game there are three pIayers and each 
pIayer has four actions: L (left), C (center), R (right), and D (defect). 
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Players' payoffs are given for each (al' az, a3) E {L, C, R, D)3 by 
(2,0,0) 
(0,2,0) 
(0,0,2) 
u(a l ,aZ,a3) = (-2,1,1) 
(1, -2,1) 
(1,1, -2) 
(0,0,0) 
if(a l ,aZ,a3) = (L,L,L) 
if(al ,aZ,a3) = (C,C,C) 
if(al ,aZ,a3) = (R,R,R) 
if(a l ,aZ,a3) = (L,D,D) 
if(al ,aZ,a3) = (D,C,D) 
if(al ,aZ,a3) = (D,D,C) 
otherwise. 
Let JL be a correlated strategy for this game, and write JLa¡aZ a3 for the 
probability of action profile (al' az, a3) E {L, C, R, D}3. We will show that 
the correlated strategy Ji satisfying JiCRL = 1 is a CPCE, but it is not a 
CPCEEP ' 
First, we show that Ji is a CPCE by proving that any improving deviation 
from Ji is vulnerable to a further self-enforcing and improving deviation. It 
is easy to see that no single player or two-player coalition has an improving 
deviation from Ji. Let ¡¡ be an improving deviation from Ji by the grand 
coalition; i.e., 0;( ¡¡) > 0, i = 1,2,3. Hence Ul ( ¡¡) + Uz< ¡¡) + Ui ¡¡) > 0, 
and therefore 
¡¡LLL + ¡¡ccc + ¡¡RRR > O. 
We show that ¡¡ is not a self-enforcing deviation (Le., that there is a 
coalition which has a further deviation which is improving and self-en-
forcing). 
Without loss of generality, assume that ¡¡ccc > O. If ¡¡ is not a corre-
lated equilibrium, then there is a single player with an improving and 
self-enforcing deviation. If ¡¡ is a correlated equilibrium, then consider the 
deviation by the coalition of players 1 and 3 in which each chooses D 
when each is recommended C, and otherwise each chooses the action he is 
recommended. This deviation induces the correlated strategy ¡i given for 
each az E {L, C, R, D} by ¡icazc = 0, ¡iDazD = ¡¡CazC + ¡¡DazD' and ¡ia¡aZa3 
= ¡¡a¡aZa3 if (al' a3) $. {(D, D), (C, C)}. Since ¡¡ccc > 0, this deviation is 
improving. Moreover, it can be seen that because ¡¡ is a correlated 
equilibrium, neither pI ayer 1 nor player 3 has a further unilateral improv-
ing deviation from ¡i, and therefore ¡i is a self-enforcing deviation. Thus, 
Ji is a CPCEMW ' 
In order to show that Ji is not a CPCEEP ' we note the grand coalition 
has an intemally consistent improvement upon Ji, given by the correlated 
, . fyin' , , 1 E' d P 1 strategy JL satis g JLLLL = JLccc = JLRRR = 3"-see my an e eg 
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(1995). Informally, E & p's notion of CPCE considers the deviation ¡l to 
be self-enforcing because each player has sorne recommendation such that 
a further deviation is not improving. For example, if after the deviation to 
¡.J player 1 (respectively, player 2 or player 3) is recommended L (respec-
tively, e or R), then his expected payoff, conditional on his recommenda-
tion, is 2, his highest possible payoff. Thus, no coalition of players has a 
further deviation which makes each member of the coalition better off for 
each of his possible recommendations. 
APPENDIX B 
In this appendix we prove Proposition B.1 which characterizes the set of 
coalition-proof Nash equilibria as the set of mixed strategies from which 
no coalition has a self-enforcing deviation which makes aH its members 
better off. 
For S E 2 N, S =1= 0, let Is denote the set of probability distributions Us 
over As = Il¡E SA¡, satisfying us(as) = D¡E Su¡(a) for aH as E As, where 
u/a) = Ia E Aulas" {¡}, a) is the marginal distribution of Us over 
S'-{i} S'-{i} 
A¡. Write I for the set IN and refer to its members as mixed strategies. If 
INI> 1, then I is a proper subset of aA. Given u E I and S E 2N, we 
denote by Us the marginal distribution of u over As O.e., Vas E As: 
ulas) = Ia_s E A_su(aS' a_s))· Here a mixed strategy is a probability 
distribution over A. A mixed strategy u E I has an equivalent and more 
conventional representation as a strategy profile, (uI , ... , uJ. 
Given an agreement (j E I, define the set of fe asible mixed deviations 
by coalition S from (j as those mixed strategies that are obtained when 
each player i, i E S, randomizes independently according to sorne iT¡, 
while each player j, j E N '\. S, foHows the agreement and randomizes 
according to Oj. In other words, u is a feasible deviation from (j by 
coalition S if u can be written as a mixed strategy profile «iT)iES' 
(Oj)j E N" s), where (iT)¡ E s is sorne mixed strategy profile for members of 
S. This is established formaHy in Definition B.l. 
DEFlNITION B.l. Let (j E I and S E 2N , S =1= 0. We say that u E I is 
a feasible mixed deviation by coalition S from (j if there is a iTs E I s, such 
that for aH a EA, we have u(a) = iTs(as)(j-s(a_s)' . 
Let DM«(j, S) denote the set of feasible mixed deviations by coalition S 
from (j. It is clear that a mixed strategy is a Nash equilibrium if no single 
player has a feasible mixed deviation which makes him better off. A mixed 
strategy is a strong Nash equilibrium if no coalition has a fe asible and 
improving mixed deviation. 
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The definition of a self-enforcing mixed deviation is obtained by replac-
ing in Definition 1.3 the set of deviations with the set of mixed deviations. 
Hence, a mixed strategy u is a self-enforcing mixed deviation by coalition 
S from u if u is a fe asible mixed deviation and if no proper subcoalition 
of S has a further self-enforcing and improving mixed deviation from u. 
DEFINITION B.2. Let u E I and S E 2N , S -=1= 0. The set of self-en-
forcing mixed deviations by coalition S from u, SEDM(u, S), is defined, 
recursively, as 
(n If ISI = 1, then SEDM(u, S) = DM(u, S); 
(in If ISI > 1, then SEDM(u, S) = (u E DM(u, S) I ¡l [R E 2s " S, 
R -=1= 0, á E SEDM(u, R)] such that Vi E R: U¡(á) > U¡(u )}. 
Using the notions of feasible and of self-enforcing deviation by a 
coalition from a mixed strategy, we define the notion of coalition-proof 
Nash equilibrium as follows. 
DEFINITION B.3. Let r = (N, (A¡)¡ E N' (u¡)¡ E N) be a game in strategic 
formo A strategy profile u E I is a CPNE' if no coalition S E 2 N, S -=1= 0, 
has a mixed deviation á E SEDM(u, S) such that for each i E S, we have 
U¡(á) > U¡(u). 
Definition B.4 below formalizes the concept of CPNE as defined by 
Bemheim, Peleg, and Whinston (1987). For convenience, the notion of 
CPNE is cast in terms of mixed strategies (members of I) instead of 
strategy pro files (members of n?~ 1 I). We abuse notation sometimes by 
writing a mixed strategy u E I as (us, u-s), where Us E Is. 
Let r = (N,(A¡)¡ E N' (u¡)¡ E N) be a game in strategic formo Given 
u E I and S E 2N "N, S -=1= 0, we write r /u- s for the game 
(S,(A¡)¡ES,(U¡)¡ES)' where for each i E S and as EAs we have 
u¡(as ) = E u_s(a_s)u¡(as , a_s)· 
"'_sEA_s 
For S = N, define r /u -s = r. The definition of CPNE given by BPW is 
recursive. 
DEFINITION B.4. Let r = (N, (A¡)¡ E N' (u)¡ E N) be a game in strategic 
formo 
(i) If INI = 1, then uI E II is a CPNE if for every á l E I I : UI(a) 
~ UI(ál )· 
(ii) Assume that CPNE has been defined for games with fewer than n 
players, and let r be a game such that INI = n. 
(a) A mixed strategy u E I is self-enforcing if for every S E 2N " N, 
S -=1= 0, Us is a CPNE of r fu_s. 
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(b) A mixed strategy u E I is a CPNE of r if it is self-enforcing, 
and if there is no other self-enforcing mixed strategy ü such that for every 
i E N: U¡(ü) > U¡(u). 
For every game in strategic form r let CPNE'(f) and CPNE(f) repre-
sent the sets of mixed strategies satisfying, respectively, Definitions B.3 and 
B.4. Also, we denote by SE(f) the set of aH self-enforcing mixed strategies 
of r. For each u E I, and each S E 2N, S -:f= 0, we write SED!'t(u, S) for 
the set of self-enforcing mixed deviations from u by coalition S in the 
game r and we denote by u¡f(u) the expected utility of player i given 
mixed strategy u in the game r. Proposition B.l can now be stated as 
foHows. 
PROPOSITION B.1. For every game r in strategic form we have CPNE(f) 
= CPNE'(f). 
Before proving the proposition, we establish two lemmas. 
LEMMA B.1. For each r, each a E I, and each S E 2N , S -:f= 0, we 
have that u = (us, a_s) E SED!'t(a, S) if and only if Us E 
sEDlIÜ-s(as, S). 
Proo! We prove the lemma by induction on the number of players in 
S. Let r be a strategic form game, a E I and S E 2N • 
(i) If S = {i}, then SED!'t(a, S) = D!'t(a, S) = Is x {a -s} and 
sEDlIÜ-s(as, S) = DlIÜ-s(as, S) = Is. Therefore, u = (us, a_s) E 
SED!'t(a, S) if and only if Us E sEDlIÜ-s(as, S). 
(iD Assume Lemma B.l holds for ISI < k. We show that it holds for 
ISI = k. 
Step 1. If Us E sEDlIÜ-s(as, S) then u = (us, a_s) E SED!'t(a, 
S). 
Let u = (us, a_s) $. SED!'t(a, S). Then there are R E 2s " S, R -:f= 0, 
and ü = (ÜR' us" R' a -s) E SED!'t«us, a -s), R) such that for each i E R 
we have u¡f(ü) > U/(u). Since IRI < k, the induction hypothesis yields 
ÜR E SEDlI(ü-s,us'R)(uR,R). Noticing that r/(a-S,uS,R) == (r/~-s)/ 
us" R' it also yields (ÜR' us" R) E SEDlIÜ-s(us, R). Moreover, for each 
i E R we have Uf/ü-s(ü u ) = Uf(ü) > Uf(u) = Uf/ü-s(u) 
, R' s" R, , , s . 
Hence, Us $. sEDlIÜ-s(as, S). 
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Step 2. If(us, u-s) E SED1(u, S) then Us E SED':¡O'-s(uS' S). 
Let U s ~ SED':¡O'-s(uS' S). Then there are R E 2s " S, R =1= 0, and 
as = (aR' us , R) E SED':¡O'-s(us, R) such that for each i E R we have 
U//O'-s(as ) > U//O'-s(us). The induction hypothesis impIies that aR E 
SEDZ'/O'-s)/US'R(uR,R). Since (f/u-S)/US,R == f/(u-S,uS,R)' it aIso 
implies that a=(aR,uS,R,U_s)ESEDÁf«us,u_s),R). Furthermore, 
for each i E R we have U/(a) = U//O'-s(as ) > U//O'-s(us) = 
U/(US, u-s). Therefore (us, u-s) ~ SED1(u, S). • 
LEMMA B.2. Let f be a game in strategic fonn. For each u E CPNE'(r) 
and each S E 2N , S =1= 0, we have Us E CPNE'(f /u_ s). 
Proof. Let u E I be such that Us ~ CPNE'(f /u- s) for some S E 2N , 
S =1= 0. We show that u ~ CPNE'(r). 
Since Us ~ CPNE'(f fu_s), then there are S' E 2s, S' =1=. 0, and as = 
(as" us , s') E SED':¡u-s(us, S') such that for each i E S', we have 
U//u-s(as) > U//u-s(us). By Lemma B.l, (as" uS'-S') E SED':¡u-s(us, 
S') implies that a = (as" us , s', u-s) E SED1(u, S'). Moreover, for each 
i E S' we have U/(a) = lf¡r /u-s(as) > lf¡r /u-s(us) = lf¡r(u). Hence u ~ 
CPNE'(r) .• 
Proof of Proposition B.l. We prove the proposition by induction on the 
number of pIayers. 
(i) If INI = 1 then Proposition B.l clearIy hoIds as for each ul E I l , 
we have SED1(ul , (I}) = I l . 
(ií) Assume that Proposition B.l is satisfied for games with fewer than 
n pIayers. We need to show that it hoIds for f with INI = n. 
Step 1. If u E CPNE(r) then u E CPNE'(r). 
Let u ~ CPNE'(r). Then there is a S E 2N, S =1= 0, and a u = 
(as, u-s) E SED1(u, S) such that for each iES, we have U/(a) > 
U/(u). 
Case a: S =1= N. Since a E SED1(u, S), by Lemma B.l as E 
SED':¡u-s(us, S). Moreover, lf¡r(a) = lf¡r /u-s(as)lf¡r /u-s(us) = U/(u) 
for each i E S. Hence, Us ~ CPNE'(f /u- s) = CPNE(f /u-s), where the 
equality follows from the induction hypothesis and that the game f / u -s 
has Iess than n pIayers. Therefore, u ~ CPNE(r). 
Case b: S = N. Assume without Ioss of generality that ti a- E 
SEDÁf(u, N) such that for each i E N, lf¡r(a-) > lf¡r(a). Then a E 
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CPNE'(f) and so by Lemma B.2, Us E CPNE'(f fu_s) = CPNE(f fu-s) 
V s E 2 N "N, S *- 0, where the equality follows from the induction 
hypothesis. Thus, U E SE(f) and for each i E N, U/ (u) > U/ (u ). There-
fore, u $. CPNE(f). 
Step 2. If u E CPNE'(f) then U E CPNE(f). 
Let U $. CPNE(f). If U $. SE(f), then there is a S E 2 N " N, S *- 0, 
such that Us $. CPNE(f fu_s) = CPNE'(f fu-s), where the equality fol-
lows from the induction hypothesis. But Lemma B.2 and U s $. 
CPNE'(f fu-s) imply that u$. CPNE'(f). 
If U E SE(f), then there is a U E SE(f) such that for each i E N, we 
have U/(u) > U/(u). We show that u E SED1(u, N), thereby proving 
that u$. CPNE'(f). 
Suppose to the contrary that u $. SED1( u, N). Since D1( u , N) = I 
(any deviation by the grand coalition is feasible), then there must be a 
S E 2N "N, S*- 0, and a a- = (a-s, u-s) E SED1(u, S) such that for 
each i E S: U/(a-) > U/(U). Since (a-s , u-s) E SED1(u, S), Lemma B.l 
yields a-s E sED1I'T-s(us , S). Moreover, for each i E S we have 
U/ /ú-s(a-s ) = U/(a-) > U/(u) = U/ /ú-s(us )' Hence Us $. CPNE'(f / 
u-s) = CPNE(f fu_s), where the equality follows from the induction 
hypothesis. Therefore, u $. SE(f). This contradiction establishes the 
proposition. • 
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